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Special Education and the Non-Public School
Child: A Handicap is a Non-Sectarian
Condition
Joyce Martin*
Wearing a green and blue school uniform and a bright smile,
Missy Hogan,' waves good-bye to her dad and pushes her wheel
chair to the front door of St. Jerome's Grade School. Missy's par-
ents have chosen St. Jerome's because, like the parents of non-
handicapped children at the school, they want a religious educa-
tion for their child; they want what they perceive as a better edu-
cation or a less disruptive learning environment for her.
But Missy has cerebral palsy and St. Jerome's cannot provide
the occupational, physical, and speech therapy she needs. The
neighborhood public school, which by law2 must provide these
services for Missy, can deliver them only at the public school or at
a "neutral" site. Missy's parents both must work and cannot trans-
port her to off-site special education during the day. They are torn
between their desire to provide a religious education for their
daughter and their desire to obtain the special education services
she needs.
Missy is entitled to these services because she is a handi-
capped child.3 Her attendance at a sectarian school does not alter
her handicapped state and should not affect her right to the serv-
ices. However, the only way she can have full access to these spe-
cial educational services without forfeiting her right to a religious
education is for the special services to be offered on-site at her pa-
rochial school.
Physically and mentally handicapped children face discrimi-
nation every day of their young lives. 4 The struggle to end this
* J.D. 1988, University of Minnesota.
1. Missy Hogan is a fictional child who represents the thousands of handi-
capped children who attend sectarian schools and do not receive special educational
services.
2. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1460 (1982 &
Supp. 1987).
3. For a discussion of federal legislation (Rehabilitation Act; Education for All
Handicapped Children Act), see infra notes 7, 9 and accompanying text.
4. In 1971, of seven million handicapped children, 60% were denied the special
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discrimination has been long and difficult.5
Historically, it has been more convenient, both legislatively
and socially, to remove handicapped children from the mainstream
than to educate them in the public schools. 6 By necessity, parents
or guardians of handicapped children have been forced to petition
• state and federal governments to ensure appropriate educational
opportunities for their children.
For that minority within a minority who, like Missy, attend
non-public schools, the need for special services from public funds
is often precariously balanced against the first amendment's man-
date of separation of church and state. Federal law requires that
all handicapped children, regardless of the school they attend,
"have available to them.., a free appropriate public education...
designed to meet their unique needs." 7 Parents may prefer to send
their child with special needs to a private, sectarian school for reli-
education assistance they needed; one million were denied entry to public schools.
Hundreds of thousands were committed to institutions. Frederick J. Weintraub,
State Law Education of Handicapped Children: Issues and Recommendations 14-15
(1971).
Today, 4.3 million children receive special education services through the pub-
lic schools. Christopher Connell & Lee Mitgang, Special Education: U.S. Set
World Standard, L.A. Times, Nov. 15, 1987, at 2, col. 1. Today, however, uneven
state standards and inadequate federal monitoring still result in inappropriate
placements and missed educational opportunities for handicapped children. Id.
5. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) estab-
lished the right of handicapped children to a free, appropriate, and publicly-funded
education. Such an education is defined as special education plus related services
necessary for a handicapped child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(c) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Related services may include transportation as well
as developmental, corrective, and other supportive services. Both educational and
related services must be provided at public expense. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16)-(18) (1982
& Supp. 1987).
Handicapped children are defined as "mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf,
speech or language impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed,
orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired children, or children with spe-
cific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require special education and re-
lated services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
The law guarantees the handicapped the right to a clean, healthy environment
within state institutions, the right to receive fair, nondiscriminatory treatment
when applying for a job, the right to barrier-free affordable housing and the right
of access, barrier-free, to public buildings and institutions. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982 &
Supp. 1987). Commentators view the struggle for equality of the disabled as part of
the general trend during the 1960s and 1970s to recognize the rights of several dis-
advantaged groups. One commentator noted that "[t]he symbols and rhetoric of the
black civil rights movement came to be used by those advocating the cause of
greater access for disabled people as well." Richard K. Skotch, From Good Will to
Civil Rights 41 (1984).
6. See United States Commmission on Civil Rights, Accomodating the Spec-
trum of Abilities 27-29 (1983).
7. 20 U.S.C.§ 1400(c) (1982 & Supp. 1987). One typical state law is Minnesota
Statute § 120.17 which states that "[e]very district shall provide special instruction
and services, either within the district or in another district, for handicapped chil-
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gious reasons, or because the public services offered for the child
are not "appropriate" and do not meet the child's special needs.
Parents such as Missy's should have this choice. A handicapped
child should not be denied special services because that child does
not attend a public school.
Legislation at the federal level and in most states now guar-
antees a "free[,] appropriate, public[ly-funded]" education to all
handicapped children.8 In addition, the federal government guar-
antees "civil rights" to handicapped individuals that are strikingly
similar to those granted racial minorities.9 Parents, however, still
face the issue of whether the education must be provided at the
site of a public school, or may be provided at a "neutral" site,10 or
at the religiously-affiliated school.
Congress designated a handicapped child's right to special ed-
ucation as a basic civil right, not as a discretionary frill." Despite
this congressional designation, the restrictive way in which these
services are delivered to sectarian-school children often forces par-
ents to choose between a guaranteed special education and the
right to a religious education. This choice pits their first amend-
ment free exercise right against a statutory entitlement.
Special education services are intrinsically different from
other educational services provided by the state to sectarian school
students. This difference stems from congressional treatment of
special education for handicapped children. Unlike other educa-
tional services, special education for mentally and physically hand-
icapped children is a congressional entitlement. Recent Supreme
dren of school age who are residents of the district and who are handicapped as set
forth in section 120.03." Minn. Stat. § 120.17 (Supp. 1988).
8. 20 U.S.C. at § 1400(c) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
9. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 states that "[n]o otherwise
qualified handicapped individual in the United States .... shall, solely by reason of
his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal finan-
cial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
This was a conscious mirroring of the language of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, which states "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Supp. 1987).
In broad terms, section 504 placed the rights of the handicapped to be free from
discrimination on a par with those of racial minorities.
10. A neutral site is "a public center, a nonsectarian nonpublic school, a mobile
unit ... or any location off the nonpublic school premises which is neither physi-
cally nor educationally identified with the functions of the nonpublic school."
Minn. Stat. § 5123.932, subd. 9 (Supp. 1988). Examples of neutral sites are hospitals,
mobile trailer vans, United Way buildings, and government buildings.
11. For a discussion of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see infra
notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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Court opinions that limit the administration of other federally-
funded educational programs on sectarian school premises' 2
should not be extended to special education services. If removal to
a "neutral site" would effectively deny the student his or her enti-
tlement to these services, special education services should be of-
fered on the parochial school premises. Handicapped children,
therefore, should be exempted from the general requirement that
publicly-funded educational services must be offered only at public
schools or neutral sites.
Part I of this article provides a short overview of the history
of private schools and the history of the handicapped in the public
schools. Part II describes legislation dealing with the handicapped.
This article argues that Congress clearly intended that children in
private schools receive direct special education services. Part III
analyzes first amendment cases under the establishment clause
and also examines first amendment cases which have been decided
under the free exercise clause. Part IV surveys recent Supreme
Court decisions dealing with the administration of other publicly-
funded educational services within sectarian schools and distin-
guishes special education services from them. This article then
concludes that because the differences between non-handicapped
services and services for handicapped children are of such magni-
tude, those cases finding a constitutional conflict in providing
state-funded services at sectarian schools should not apply to spe-
cial education services.
I. Sectarian Schools and the Handicapped Student:
A Historical Background
The history of American education has been intertwined with
the tradition of sectarian schools. Private education has played an
important role in educating a significant percentage of our nation's
children.13 From the moment the federal government established
that handicapped children were entitled to a publicly-funded, ap-
propriate education, parents and advocates have voiced concern
about the role of sectarian schools in that education. The issue re-
lates primarily to the individual child, her special educational
needs and her entitlement to that education. Federal involvement
through legislation and Supreme Court decisions should not stum-
ble on the public/private distinction.
12. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School District of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes
118-122.




In colonial times, America's elementary and secondary sys-
tem was exclusively private and Protestant-dominated. 14 After the
Revolution it evolved into a public, non-sectarian system. The im-
migrants who arrived after 1840, the majority of whom were Cath-
olic, established schools which reflected their religious
backgrounds and offered alternatives to the emerging public
education.15
In 1925, the Supreme Court recognized the right of parents to
choose a religious education for their children instead of public ed-
ucation. 16 As the Court stated, "[T]he child is not the mere crea-
ture of the state .... [T]he fundamental theory of liberty ...
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."17
Although this concept was formulated fifty-two years before the
present issue arose, the theory has been consistently followed by
the Court.'8
Justice Powell, in a frequently quoted portion of Wolman v.
Walter,I9 asserted that:
[p]arochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose,
have provided an educational alternative for millions of young
Americans; ... and in some States they relieve substantially
the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools. The
State has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating educa-
tion of the highest quality for all children within its bounda-
ries, whatever school their parents have chosen for them.20
Today, the courts and the American public view private
schools ambivalently. 21 For some members of the Court and the
general public, fear of excessive entanglement of state and religion
14. "In the first or colonial stage ... [t]he churches controlled the only schools
... and they were Protestant .... [FIrom the Revolution to about 1840[,] . .. Ameri-
can Protestantism, rather reluctantly, accepted the idea of the public school as the
common training ground for the children of all faiths." Paul Blanshard, Religion
and the Schools 6-7 (1963).
15. Id. at 7.
16. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 523 (1925).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Wollman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
19. Id,
20. Id. at 262 (Powell, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part). In the case, the
Court found an Ohio statute allowing expenditure of public funds for the purchase
of textbooks, instructional materials, and health services for nonpublic students
constitutional. Justice Powell maintained that except for the portions relating to
instructional materials and field trip services, the state interest in assuring the
highest quality education for all its children predominated, regardless of the type of
school attended. Id.
21. See George Goldberg, Church, State and the Constitution 108-11 (1987).
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outweighs the positive contributions of private schools.22
B. Special education
Before the mid-twentieth century most public schools did not
allow handicapped children23 to attend.24 Handicapped children
were either institutionalized or cared for by family members.25
Historically, handicapped children and their parents received no
benefits from the tax-supported public school system. 26
Public schools rejected handicapped children for several rea-
sons. They frequently were considered uneducable.27 Public
schools considered the costs of training teachers and delivering
services to the handicapped prohibitive. The special needs of
handicapped children, and the necessity of keeping teacher-pupil
ratios low arguably raised the cost of educating and training the
special child significantly above that of the normal child.28
Recent federal and state legislation, however, has attempted
to correct some of the inequities this segment of the population
has suffered. In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)29 which guarantees every
handicapped child a "free, appropriate, public education." 30
Courts have definitively decided that children, such as Missy,
who attend private sectarian schools, are covered by the Act.3 '
The Supreme Court has not addressed, however, the issue of
where that education must be delivered. Despite Congressional ac-
tion in enacting the EAHCA, individual states have adopted vari-
ous interpretations of their responsibilities to handicapped
children enrolled in sectarian schools.32 States have developed a
22. See Hearing on Voucher and Tuition Tax Credit Plans, Senate Finance
Committee (April 23, 1981); Group Plans to Push for School Voucher System, Mpls.
Star & Tribune, Oct. 15, 1986, § B, at 8, col. 1.
23. See supra note 5.
24. See Stephen B. Thomas, Legal Issues in Special Education 1-3 (1985).
25. President's Committee on the Employment of the Handicapped, Disabled
Americans: A History, 27 Performance 3 (1976).
26. See United States Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 6, at 71.
27. In 1893, a Massachusetts handicapped child was suspended from school be-
cause he was "so weak in mind as not to derive any marked benefit from school
instruction." Watson v. City of Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.E. 864 (1893).
28. See Comment, Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education of the Men-
tally Retarded, 34 Ohio St. L.J. 554, 559 (1973).
29. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1460 (1982
& Supp. 1987).
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
31. See Tilton v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 1983);
Walker v. Cronin, 107 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 438 N.E.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1982); Vander
Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1982).
32. When the public schools have been unable to provide appropriate special ed-
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variety of ways to offer instruction to non-public school handi-
capped children. One method, "on-site education", usually the
most desirable to parents, consists of instruction offered at the site
of the parochial school. Other states offer instruction at a "neutral
site." This entails instruction off the sectarian school premises,
but at reasonable proximity. Neutral sites include mobile trailers
in school parking lots, nearby non-religiously affiliated hospitals,
and United Way buildings.33
Neutral site or public school delivery of special education
services effectively denies sectarian children services if families
must arrange transportation for the children to and from the
school special education site. Traveling exposes handicapped chil-
dren to possible accidents or other harm. The children often miss
a significant portion of religious education because of the time
spent traveling to and from the neutral site. In either situation
parents and guardians must choose between religious education
and the safe delivery of special education services which are their
children's entitlement under the EAHCA.34 This choice, alone, is
a violation of the free exercise of their religion.35
II. The Rights of the Handicapped
Congress has not ignored the special needs of the handi-
capped. It has instead definitively established the rights of the
handicapped on a par with the rights of racial minorities. The
Supreme Court has also addressed the responsibilities owed the
handicapped by public entities.36 These Supreme Court decisions
ucational services, for purely budgetary reasons, alternate arrangements for the
child's education can be instituted. See, e.g., Tilton v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ.,
705 F.2d 800, 805 (6th Cir. 1983). If the public schools offer satisfactory aid but par-
ents have chosen a private education, tuition reimbursement has not been available.
See, e.g., Mountain View-Los Altos Union High School Dist. v. Sharron B.H., 709
F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1983). If the withdrawal of the child is the result of long adminis-
trative delays, then the public educational unit may be held responsible for costs.
See, e.g., Walker, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 1060, 438 N.E.2d at 587. Therapy in some states
has been available only at a "neutral site" or at the public school. See, e.g., Bales v.
Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981). Educational and support services have
been offered on site in some states. See, e.g., Vander Malle, 673 F.2d at 49.
33. The theory of the "neutral site" delivery springs from Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 367-73 (1975). This case indicated that the mere presence of a public
school teacher on sectarian school grounds could lead to an impermissible entangle-
ment of state with religion. Id. at 359.
34. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1460 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
35. See infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Burlington School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359
(1985) (court may order school authorities to reimburse parents for private special
education services for child if it determines such placement is appropriate). See
also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1019 (1984).
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under the fourteenth amendment have established the right to
special education as a basic civil right. 37
A. Fourteenth Amendment Protection
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 38 The
Civil War experience and the need to protect the rights of Blacks
throughout the country provided the impetus for passage of the
fourteenth amendment in 1868.39 Currently, the Supreme Court
interprets the fourteenth amendment as imposing a duty on state
governments to treat all citizens equally.40 Its protections are not
confined to minorities, but have been extended to other disadvan-
taged groups as well.4 1
The Supreme Court has concluded that classifications which
are based on suspect criteria are subject to a strict equal protection
standard of review. Classifications that disadvantage racial minori-
ties are the clearest examples of suspect classifications. A suspect
class has traditionally been defined as one that is disadvantaged by
37. "Congress also recognized that in a series of 'landmark court cases,' the
right to an equal opportunity for handicapped children had been established."
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010 (1984).
38. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
39. See James Mussati, The Constitution of the United States 195-98 (1960).
40. The Court has identified certain classifications-race, alienage, and nation-
ality-that are entitled to special protection under the fourteenth amendment. The
Court applies the "strict scrutiny standard of review" to legislation which classifies
these groups. Such legislation must be justified by a compelling state purpose apart
from its discriminatory purpose in order to pass this standard of review. Classifica-
tions based on race are subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia's miscegenation statute held unconsitutional); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("separate but equal" held to have no place in
public education); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (race cannot be a factor in
custody decisions). The Court has granted intermediate status to classifications
based on illegitimacy and gender. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)
(Act allowing illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from their
mothers but not from their fathers held a violation of Equal Protection); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender is not sufficiently related to traffic safety to war-
rant differential treatment in the law); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upheld
New York law forbidding intestate inheritance by illegitimate children unless there
was judicial finding of paternity during father's lifetime); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (law giving preference to men in appointment of administrators of estates
struck down as forbidden by equal protection); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973) (sustained equal protection challenge to federal law requiring ser-
vicewomen to prove husbands were dependent while giving automatic dependency
allowance to wives of servicemen).
41. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (fourteenth amendment
extended to alienage classifications); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (fourteenth amendment extended to nationality classifications).
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characteristics which are solely an accident of birth; or one which
has been subjected to a history of unequal treatment; or a group
which has been relegated to a position of political powerlessness
such that extraordinary protection from the majority is
necessary. 42
The Supreme Court recently refused to grant the handi-
capped suspect status in City of Cieburne v. Cleburne Living
Center.43 The Court stated that "[o]ur refusal to recognize the re-
tarded as a quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely unpro-
tected from invidious discrimination."44 The Court, although
purporting to use a rational basis review, concluded that "requir-
ing a permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prej-
udice against the mentally retarded."45
The fourteenth amendment guarantees the right of equal op-
portunity to educational resources. In the past, the handicapped
have suffered discrimination and have been offered inferior educa-
tional opportunities. Although the C/eburne Court appeared
somewhat ambivalent about the status of the handicapped, the en-
titlement language of federal legislation for the handicapped and
the close analogy of handicapped discrimination to racial discrimi-
nation imply that handicapped children should be afforded an
equal opportunity to be educated to their full potential.
While the rights of handicapped children to a free appropri-
ate education emerged gradually on the national conscience,46 the
Supreme Court acted boldly in an analogous area-that of educa-
tional discrimination based on race. In 1954 the Supreme Court
decided Brown v. Board of Education,47 which declared that sepa-
42. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
43. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The city of Cleburne required builders of group homes
for the retarded and the aged to acquire permits. The Cleburne Learning Center
challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional after being denied a permit. The
Court struck down the ordinance but not on grounds that the retarded are a sus-
pect classification.
Several factors, however, warrant granting the handicapped suspect status.
The handicapped meet the definition of a discrete and insular minority. The Court
first used the concept of a "discrete and insular minority" to identify questionable
classifications based on race. See Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4. The
handicapped evoke stereotypes that carry the stigma of inferiority. See Charles
Black, The Lawfulness of Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421, 424-25 (1960).
They often suffer from conditions that are immutable. See Weber v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Ins. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1972). Finally, the handicapped have been sub-
jected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment. See Pennsylvania Association
for Retarded Citizens v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.
Pa. 1971).
44. C7eburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
45. Id. at 450.
46. See infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court repudiated the "separate but equal doctrine"
1987]
Law and Inequality
rate educational facilities for Black students were inherently une-
qual.48  The decision heightened awareness among school
administrators, the judicial system, and the public at large to the
issues of various kinds of discrimination within the public schools.
In Brown, the Court relied on psychological and sociological stud-
ies analyzing the effects of segregated education.49 Researchers
found that even when separate instruction was provided in facili-
ties equal to those provided for white students, the education was
inherently unfair.50 Such an education inhibited Black children's
educational and social development enough to deny them basic
rights.51
Brown, although aimed at redressing educational inequities
based on race, arguably also applies to those who face educational
discrimination based on handicap. Early cases dealing with the
rights of the handicapped to an education relied on and stretched
the concepts employed in Brown.52 Recently, parents have at-
tacked the use of mobile units parked in parochial school lots
(units used as "neutral sites" for providing education to the handi-
capped) as both "stigmatizing" and a violation of the Brown man-
date of desegregated schooling.53
In 1971, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (hereinafter PARC),54 applied
the Brown precedent to the controversy created by exclusionary
and discriminatory practices in public schools against handicapped
children. The consent decree in PARC guaranteed educational
programs for all of Pennsylvania's mentally retarded children
prior to the passage of federal legislation guaranteeing certain edu-
cational rights to handicapped children55 Despite settlement,
PARC established that mentally retarded persons are capable of
benefitting from an education; that the state must provide re-
tarded persons with a free publicly financed program of education
and training appropriate to their capacity; that the mentally re-
which had dominated the treatment of public facilities for Blacks and whites since
1896. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Brown established that children
could not be segregated in essentially "equal" schools solely on the basis of race.
48. 347 U.S. at 495.
49. Id. at 493.
50. Id. at 494.
51. Id. at 495.
52. See ikfra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
53. Conversation with Kathy Boundy, Attorney, Center for Law and Education,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, January 7, 1987.
54. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), qff'd on rehearing 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (Approving and adopting amended stipulation, amending consent agree-
ment and issuing injunction).
55. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1460 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
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tarded child is entitled to these benefits even if he attends a pri-
vate school; and that placement in the regular classroom is
preferable to segregated facilities.56
In Mills v. Board of Education,57 decided in 1972, the D.C.
District Court expanded the right to an appropriate public educa-
tion to children labelled "emotionally disturbed", "mentally re-
tarded", "hyperactive" or as having "behavior problems".5 8
The success of the plaintiffs' claims in PARC and Mills
prompted the filing of a myriad of related claims, ranging from the
right of institutionalized children to receive treatment to an ac-
knowledgement that the compulsory education laws also applied to
the handicapped.59 The plaintiffs were generally successful.6 0 As
a result, courts provided plaintiffs with programs designed to meet
the unique needs of special children.61
B. Federal Legislation
Absent action prompted by litigation, public schools contin-
ued to segregate or exclude handicapped children.62 A tireless ad-
vocate or enlightened state legislature could win significant rights
for handicapped children within a specific locale. Federal legisla-
tion was needed, however, to provide uniform services to handi-
capped children in every state in the nation. The Rehabilitation
Act of 197363 was the first step toward a guarantee of basic civil
rights for the handicapped, including the right to an education.
The Act was crucial, indicating the basic philosophical commit-
ment of Congress to educational equality for the handicapped. To
implement this goal, Congress enacted the Education for Handi-
capped Children Act (EAHCA)64 in 1975. EAHCA provided spe-
cific guidelines and timetables for achieving equality for
handicapped children.65
56. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 290.
57. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
58. Id. at 881.
59. See, e.g., Maryland Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Maryland, Eq. No. 1001
(Cir. Ct. Bait. City 1976): Wolf v. Legislature of the State of Utah, No. 182646 (3d
Jud. D. C. Utah, Jan. 8, 1969).
60. See Frederick J. Weintraub, Bruce A. Ramirez & Joseph Ballard, Introduc-
tion: Bridging the Decades, in Special Education in America: Its Legal and Govern-
mental Foundations 3 (1982).
61. See H. Rutherford Turnbull III, Legal Aspects of Educating the Develop-
mentally Disabled 14, 30-31 (1975).
62. See Weintraub, Ramirez & Ballard, supra note 60, at 14.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).




1. The Rehabilitation Act
The earliest efforts to secure rights for the handicapped were
made by Senator Hubert Humphrey and Congressman Charles
Vanik, both of whom introduced legislation to extend the benefits
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to handicapped individualsee
Although the effort failed, civil rights for the handicapped became
a legislative agenda item for several liberal legislators.
In 1972, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
included several legislators concerned with civil rights for the
handicapped. They formed one of the most liberal and activist
committees in Congress. 67 The Committee was charged with the
renewal of the vocational rehabilitation program.68 That group
drafted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to expand and improve the
program to serve disability groups with special problems.69 The
most significant portion of the Rehabilitation Act was section 504
which stated:
"[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States.... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing federal financial assistance." 7 0
The language of section 504 was taken directly from the Civil
66. Richard K. Skotch, From Good Will to Civil Rights 43 (1984). Senator
Humphrey introduced a bill on January 20, 1972 to "amend the Civil Rights Act of
1964 in order to prohibit discrimination on the basis of physical or mental handicap
in federally assisted programs." S. 3094, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Congressman
Vanik used similar language in the House bill he introduced. H.R. 12154, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972). The bills were referred to the respective judiciary committees. No
hearings were held on the bills and neither was brought to a vote in committee or
on the floor of either house. Although no record exists regarding what happened
within the two judiciary committees, one authority suggests that the bills were
probably "killed" by committee liberals. Skotch, supra, at 44. Opposition may have
come from those who were committed to protecting the groups already covered by
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Id.
67. Skotch, supra note 66, at 45-46.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1986) (regulations implementing the legislation
are at 34 C.F.R. § 104.1-.61 (1987)). "Handicapped" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 706
(8)(A) (1985 & Supp. 1987) as "any individual who (i) has a physical or mental disa-
bility which for such individual constitutes or results in substantial handicap to em-
ployment or (ii) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability
from vocational rehabilitation services."
69. Skotch, supra note 66, at 46.
70. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 794). The Committee on Education and Labor in the House was also
examining the Rehabilitation Act. Congress designed the Rehabilitation Act of
1977 to improve and expand the existing vocational rehabilitation program. Section
504 provided "the one unifying key to mainstreaming of the disabled population
into the general community. " Skotch, supra note 66, at 53 (quoting Frank G.
Bowen, Handicapping America 205 (1978)).
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Rights Act of 1964.71 This language meant that handicapped peo-
ple, like Blacks, would not be excluded from participation in or de-
nied benefits of any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance because of their condition.72
Programs for the handicapped could not be isolated from
those of non-handicapped students unless segregation was neces-
sary for the program's effective functioning. Section 504, however,
failed to provide for any public expenditures to guarantee those
rights. Although the section directed schools to provide for their
handicapped students' needs, it failed to specifically outline the ap-
plication of its principles to the school setting. However, Congress'
greater specificity and higher level of commitment embodied in
the statute elevated the right to education for the handicapped
above the minimum set forth by compulsory education laws.73
2. The Education for Handicapped Children Act
To further promote equal education for handicapped chil-
dren, Congress enacted the Education for Handicapped Children
Act (EAHCA) in 1975.74 EAHCA (known also as the Bill of
Rights for Education for Handicapped Children) 75 guaranteed
every handicapped child a "free appropriate public education." 76
Such an education is defined as "an education provided at public
expense . . . that meets the standards of the state educational
agency."7 7
EAHCA extended section 504 and clarified its application to
private schools. This appropriate, publicly-funded education must
be provided to all handicapped children regardless of the school
they attend.78 The statute gave the handicapped child a direct en-
titlement to educational services. The sectarian or non-sectarian
nature of the school the child attended was irrelevant. 79
The Act failed, however, to specify where a handicapped
child must receive special services. Thus, parents of a handicapped
child enrolled in parochial school continued to have legitimate con-
cerns about issues such as the child's entitlement to special educa-
71. The section uses the exact language of the Title VI, § 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, substituting the word "handicap" for the words "race, color or
national origin". 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982 & Supp. 1987).
72. See Skotch, supra note 66, at 51-52.
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1400.11 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
74. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1460 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
75. Thomas, supra note 24, at 13.
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
77. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(d) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B)(i) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
79. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412, 1413(d) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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tion services when he was enrolled in a sectarian school; the
availability of services on-site when transportation would be dan-
gerous; and the availability of compensation for expenses if the
parents chose to provide private transportation to the public
facility.
An amendment to the Act in 198380 provided for direct fed-
eral intervention where individual states were not providing spe-
cial programs for handicapped children enrolled in private schools.
The amendment authorized the Secretary of Education to bypass
the State Educational Agency (SEA) to provide services to those
children if state law prohibited the SEA from providing special
programs for the handicapped children enrolled in non-public
school.8 ' Congress was straightforward in stating its intent to in-
clude handicapped children enrolled in private schools in its cover-
age under the bill. Section 1413 states that:
handicapped children in private schools and facilities will be
provided special education and related services ... at no cost to
their parents or guardian.... as the means of carrying out the
requirements of this subchapter or any other applicable law
requiring the provision of special education and related serv-
ices to all handicapped children within such State .... 82
The successful implementation of this provision depends
greatly on the individual state's commitment to providing costly
transportation between the child's home school and the neutral or
public school site where services are delivered. In practice, trans-
portation is frequently not offered or is inadequate.8 3 When trans-
portation is not available, parents are faced with three options:
providing the transportation themselves, allowing the child to
walk to the site where services will be offered, or foregoing the
special education services. Parents who work, do not own a car, or
have other responsibilities are unable to choose the first option. If
the child's disability involves motor coordination, retardation, or
perceptual difficulties, the obvious dangers of allowing such a child
to cross streets unassisted precludes the second option. Similarly,
because of transportation and scheduling conflicts, a child may be
80. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1985). The amendment which was en-
acted in 1983 extended the fiscal authorization of the EAHCA discretionary pro-
grams to respond to emerging needs in the education of the handicapped.
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This provision was intended
to rectify a problem in Missouri where the state's constitution had been interpreted
to preclude the state from providing services to students enrolled in private schools.
Cong. Res. Serv. Rep., Amendment to EAHCA, Act of 1975 (1983).
82. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B)(i) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
83. Interview with Elizabeth Hennessey, parent advocate, Association for Re-




forced to miss valued religious training at the sectarian school she
attends. Parents may be faced with the choice of educating the
child with the religious values they desire without the special edu-
cation services, or transferring the child to a public school where
the services to which she is entitled are readily available.
III. Freedom of Religion and the First Amendment
This choice between religious education and special education
inhibits the rights of handicapped children and their parents to the
free exercise of religion. Providing publicly-funded services at
religious schools, however, also raises issues concerning the estab-
lishment of religion.
The Supreme Court has dealt with religious education under
the two clauses of the first amendment concerning religion: the
establishment clause, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . " and the free exercise clause, "or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "84
In its attempts to prohibit the establishment of religion, while
simultaneously promoting the free exercise of religion, the Court
has had to draw fine lines and create tortuous tests to avoid violat-
ing either clause.
Parents of handicapped children in sectarian schools also face
both clauses concurrently. Should their attempt to secure the spe-
cial in-school educational services guaranteed their children by law
be construed as an attempt to establish their religion by entangling
the public school teacher in a religious institution? Or should the
insistence that the education take place on public school or neutral
property be viewed as a violation of their free exercise of religion
because it forces a choice between the entitled services and reli-
gious conduct?
A. The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause has been invoked to deny services
to sectarian schools8 5 when publicly-funded assistance is viewed as
aid to the school, rather than as direct assistance to children or
parents. Congress' intent, in enacting section 504 of the Rehabili-
84. U.S. Const. amend. I.
85. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (tax bene-
fits to parents of sectarian schools impermissibly advance religion); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (salary supplement to nonpublic school teachers en-
tangled government in religion); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472
(1975) (test prepared by public school teachers for use in sectarian schools has the
primary effect of advancing religion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (auxil-
iary services, except textbooks, advance religion when provided by public schools).
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tation Act and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act,
however, was clearly to entitle all handicapped children to these
benefits regardless of the school attended.8 6 The Supreme Court
has not addressed the specific issue of handicapped services in the
sectarian school setting, but has decided a number of establish-
ment clause cases which dealt with other aid received by sectarian
schools.
The test currently employed by the Court to evaluate estab-
lishment of religion claims was first espoused in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man.87 The Lemon test states that: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion...; finally,
the statute must not foster an excessive goverm-nent entanglement
with religion."8 8
The Court has carefully limited certain types of aid that meet
all three prongs - "purpose", "effects" and "excessive entangle-
ment."8 9 Tax deductions for educational expenses9° and secular
textbooks9 l have been allowed when they directly benefited the
child and not the sectarian school. When, however, the Court has
determined that state aid to sectarian education has the principle
effect of advancing a religion, or that the method by which that aid
was administered has excessively entangled the state in a religion,
the Court has not hesitated to find that practice in violation of the
establishment clause. 92
86. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
87. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
88. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
89. The first prong of the Lemon test is referred to as the "purpose test" be-
cause "the statute must have a secular purpose." 403 U.S. at 612. The "effects test"
forms the second prong; "[the statute's] principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id. The final prong is the "entangle-
ment test"; "the statute must not foster and excessive government entanglement
with religion." Id.
90. In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), the Court allowed Minnesota to re-
tain a tax deduction for educational expenses incurred by parents of nonpublic
school children. The case was carefully distinguished from Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), in which tuition grants to parents were only a
cover for maintenance and repair grants directly to the schools. Mueller, 463 U.S.
at 394, 398. The Minnesota tax deductions, in contrast, aided individual parents NOT
the sectarian schools. Id. at 398-402.
91. The Court permitted the loan of secular textbooks to public schools in
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). In Elbe v. Yankton Indep. School Dist.
No. 1, 714 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1983), the Eighth Circuit viewed those services as being
provided to the children and not to the sectarian school, thus avoiding any "exces-
sive entanglement" of the state with religion. Similarly, the Court regards publicly
funded bus transportation or bus fare to nonpublic sectarian school children as a
permissible use of funds to assist children and not their schools. Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
92. In Lemon, the Court concluded that the state's reimbursement to non-pub-
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The Court's decisions have confused many commentators.
Justice White, the lone dissenter in Lemon, articulated one facet
of this confusion:
The Court thus creates an insoluble paradox for the State and
parochial schools. The State cannot finance secular instruction
if it permits religion to be taught in the same classroom; but if
it exacts a promise that religion not be taught, a promise the
schools and its teachers are quite willing and on the record
able to give and enforce, it is then entangled in the "no entan-
glement" aspect of the Court's jurisprudence. 93
For parents of a handicapped child who desire a religious ed-
ucation for their children, Justice White's paradox has often re-
sulted in a painful choice - the choice between neglecting their
child's religious needs or her special educational needs.
Allowing a handicapped child such as Missy to receive special
services within her sectarian school does not violate the establish-
ment clause. Under the Lemon test, the purpose of providing such
services on site must be secular. Here, the purpose is to provide
the child with special educational services to which she is entitled.
This is a secular purpose and one explicitly found by Congress.94
Under the second prong of Lemon, the effect of this course of ac-
tion must be analyzed for either the advancement or inhibition of
religion. Like transportation subsidies9 5 and tax deductions for
textbooks,96 allowing a handicapped child to receive special educa-
tional services at her sectarian school would directly benefit the
child, not the religious school. Since such schools do not ordinarily
provide such services, this action would not benefit the school by
relieving them of an expense. Rather, it would permit children to
receive the services to which they are entitled. Finally, providing
special education at sectarian schools would not violate the third
prong of Lemon because the state would not be excessively entan-
lic schools for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials
resulted in excessive entanglement of church and state. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620. In
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1975), the Court struck down a
state program reimbursing nonpublic schools for the cost of teacher-prepared ex-
aminations. Common to both cases was prolonged supervision and administration
of the nonpublic school by the state agent, the public school system. Id. at 480.
In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court struck down the direct
loan of general instructional materials to nonpublic schools. The direct loan of
textbooks to individual students, however, was upheld in Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977).
93. 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., concurring).
94. 20 U.S.C § 1400 (1982 & Supp. 1987). See supra notes 29-31 and accompany-
ing text.
95. The Supreme Court regards publicly funded bus transportation or bus fare
to nonpublic sectarian school children as a permissible use of funds to assist chil-
dren and not their schools. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
96. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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gled in religious education; the services themselves are religiously
neutral and any religious symbols could be eradicated from the site
prior to its use for special education. The arguments against pro-
viding the sectarian child with special education services at the pa-
rochial school focus on the cost of providing such individualized
services,97 and the fear that such on-site services would result in
the establishment of religion.98 It is also argued that the student's
free exercise of religion is not violated by requiring the child to
travel to a public school or neutral site for the services. 99
The Lemon test, however, has been the Court's primary
framework for deciding such cases. Under this rationale, providing
special education services to handicapped children is not a viola-
tion of the establishment clause.
B. Free Exercise of Religion Cases
The second half of the constitutional concept of freedom of
religion is the free exercise clause. The tension of the establish-
ment clause with the free exercise clause has led to confusion
about predicting the Supreme Court's stand on a particular reli-
gious issue. As Justice Harlan stated, "[I]t is far easier to agree on
the purpose that underlies the First Amendment's Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses, than to obtain agreement on the stan-
dards that should govern their applications."' 0 0
An early case interpreting the free exercise clause, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,101 established the right of parents to educate
their children in religious schools. Parents of handicapped chil-
dren seek the same free exercise right without being deprived of
their children's entitlement to a free, appropriate special
education.
Cases analyzing the free exercise clause are split between
those protecting only verbal expression 102 and those that also pro-
tect religious conduct.' 0 3 This distinction was a recognition of the
97. See Thomas, supra note 13, at 24.
98. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text. Although Aquilar decided
the establishment clause consequences of Title I services to economically deprived
children in sectarian schools, the same arguments with respect to handicapped chil-
dren could be raised.
100. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
101. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
102. In the Mormon polygamy case, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1879), the Court decided that behavior such as polygamy enjoyed no first amend-
ment protection when it extended beyond the expression of religious opinion to be-
come an act hostile to good civil order. The distinction between freedom of religion
and freedom of speech was not a bright line. Id. at 166.
103. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), in which the Court struck
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Framers' view that religious opinion and expression were entitled
to greater protection than religious conduct.104 Only recently, the
Court has seen that religious conduct, such as the decision to en-
roll one's children in a religious school, is deserving of protection
also. The case which established that religious conduct is entitled
to protection under the first amendzaent is Sherbert v. Verner.i05
In Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church,
which prohibits work on Saturdays, faced losing her unemploy-
ment benefits when she refused to accept a job requiring her to
work Saturdays. The Court ruled that the state's disqualification
of her benefits clearly imposed a burden on her free exercise of
religion because it "force[d] her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits .... and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion to accept work."' 06
Parents of handicapped children who wish to educate their
children in their religious traditions are forced to choose between
the free exercise of their religion and critical services to which
their children are entitled. Federal law guarantees the right of all
handicapped children to special educational services.' 07 If the
down a state law requiring a group of Jehovah's Witnesses to purchase a license
before soliciting support for their views. The decision was based not on freedom of
speech, but rather on the fact that the license "amount[ed] to a prior restraint on
their religion." Id. at 304. The Court was developing the concept of free exercise of
religion beyond a mere corollary to freedom of speech. In cases following Cantwell,
the Court invalidated state laws which forced the individual to make a choice of
either violating his or her conscience or foregoing a state benefit to which he or she
is entitled. See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390
(1949) (requirement of affidavit stating nonassociation with Communist party held
valid under Constitution in part because it did not forbid nonsigners from holding
office or require their discharge); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952)
(Court struck down state loyalty oath which required employees to deny past or
present affiliation with any subversive organization).
104. Madison was deeply involved in the writing and creation of the final form of
the Bill of Rights. He played a central role in the debate on the first amendment.
See Elwyn Smith, Religious Liberty in the United States 247 (1972). Madison's pri-
mary concern was for the freedom and autonomy of conscience. Irving Brant, 3
James Madison 271 (1961).
Although Madison and his fellow statesmen believed fine distinctions between
the establishment and free exercise clauses were unnecessary, subsequent Supreme
Courts have faced a host of problems in applying both portions simultaneously. See
Smith, supra, at 248.
Thomas Jefferson established the guidelines: "[T]o suffer the civil magistrate to
intrude his powers into the field of opinion... is dangerous fallacy .... It is time
enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere
when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order." Thomas
Jefferson, Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 The Papers of Thomas Jef-
ferson 305 (1950).
105. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
106. Id. at 400.
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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child's disabilities mean that he or she cannot safely make the
commute to the public facility, the child's parents are forced to
choose between the religious education or the special education
services. If the scheduling of special education means that a child
must routinely miss religious instruction, children are again forced
to choose between religious and special education. These children,
like the plaintiff in Sherbert, are entitled to the free exercise of
their religion. Forcing children to forego necessary services vio-
lates the free exercise clause.
IV. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Although it seems clear that providing special education serv-
ices to handicapped children on sectarian school sites does not vio-
late either the free exercise clause or the establishment clause,OS
recent Supreme Court decisions have held that providing some
non-handicapped services at religious schools does violate the es-
tablishment clause.1° 9
School administrators might be tempted to extend these deci-
sions to entitled handicapped services because of a possible estab-
lishment clause violation. The radical distinction between the
basic civil rights language of special educational services and those
of other educational programs, however, must be noted in distin-
guishing the recent cases from those of children in need of special
education.n 0
In 1974, the Supreme Court in Wheeler v. Barrera,"' held
that Title I services could be administered on private school sites if
local law allowed the services at private sites." 2 Title I is a feder-
ally funded program which allocates grants to school districts
where three percent of elementary and secondary students are
from families with income less than $2,000. Children from private
schools are figured into the formula to determine the total disad-
vantaged population of the district.. 13 The program is aimed at
meeting the needs of impoverished children, not those who are
handicapped.
108. See supra notes 94-96, 107 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 9.
111. 417 U.S. 402 (1974).
112. Id at 419.
113. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3805(a); 3806(a) (1965). Title I is officially known as the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Title I has been superseded by the
Financial Assistance to Meet Special Educational Needs of Disadvantaged Children
Act, Ch. 1 95 Stat. 464 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3801 (1982)).
Title I funds were to be used in meeting the needs of educationally-deprived
children who were not necessarily handicapped.
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In Wheeler, the Court permitted remedial instruction by pub-
lic school teachers on parochial school premises. The Court noted
that it "intimated no view as to the Establishment Clause effect of
any particular program."114 Public and parochial school adminis-
trators relied on the permissive language in Wheeler to provide Ti-
tle I services at sectarian school sites. Then, in 1985, the Court
issued two decisions which ruled on the issue of the proper deliv-
ery site for programs to non-handicapped parochial school
children.
In School District v. Ball,115 the Court invalidated two state-
funded programs conducted on private school property - Shared
Time and Community Education." 6 The Court affirmed the dis-
trict court decision that the "Shared Time and Community Educa-
tion programs ha[d] the 'primary or principal' effect of advancing
religion, and, therefore, violate[d] the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment."17
In Aguilar v. Felton,"8 decided on the same day as Grand
Rapids, the Court defined the state's responsibility to provide Title
I services to children attending sectarian private schools. New
York City had provided Title I programs to parochial school chil-
dren in private school buildings. The city used funds received
under the program to pay the salaries of public school employees
who taught in the parochial schools.119 A city taxpayers' group
challenged the administration of the Title I program, claiming that
114. 417 U.S. at 426.
115. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
116. Shared Time and Community Education programs were instituted in Grand
Rapids, Michigan in the 1976-77 school year and provided classes to nonpublic
school students at public expense in classrooms located in and leased from the local
nonpublic schools. The Shared Time program offered classes during the regular
school day that were intended to be supplementary to the "core curriculum"
courses required of an accredited school program in Michigan. Remedial and en-
richment math and reading, art, music and physical education were among the of-
ferings. Id. at 375-76.
The Community Education Program was offered in Grand Rapids schools and
on other sites, for children as well as for adults. Courses were taught in the non-
public schools after the regular day. Among the courses offered were: Arts and
Crafts, Home Economics, Spanish, Dramatics, Gymnastics, Yearbook Production,
Newpaper, Humanities, Chess, Model Building, and Nature Appreciation. Id. at
376-77.
117. Id. at 397. Justices O'Connor and Burger disagreed with the Court's deci-
sion to invalidate the Shared Time program. Both Justices asserted that statistical
evidence showed that the program did not cause excessive entanglement of church
and state. Id. (O'Connor J., and Burger C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
118. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
119. Id. at 406-09.
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it violated the establishment clause of the first amendment.120
The Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that Title I pro-
grams could not be provided on the sectarian site.121 The Court
determined that Title I public school teachers were "performing
important educational services in schools in which education is an
integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an at-
mosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is con-
stantly maintained."' 122
Justices Burger, Rehnquist and O'Connor all wrote separate
dissenting opinions.'2 3 The dissenting Justices pointed out the "in-
consistencies in our Establishment Clause decisions can be
ascribed to our insistence that parochial aid programs with a valid
purpose and effect may still be invalid by virtue of undue entan-
glement."'124 Further, the dissents asserted that New York City's
administration of the Title I program had practical advantages as
well.125
120. The district court upheld the program's constitutionality. Id. at 407. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Aguilar v. Felton, 739 F.2d 48 (2d
Cir. 1984).
121. 473 U.S. at 414.
122. Id. at 412 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 (1975)). The major-
ity opinion rested on the impermissible "excessive entanglement of church and
state ... As in Lemon, [the Court concluded] the amount of supervision necessary
to insure that teachers were not conveying religious messages to their students
would constitute the excessive entanglement of church and state ... " Aguilar, 473
U.S. at 410.
123. 473 U.S. at 419-31. Chief Justice Burger spoke of denying countless children
Title I services and criticized the Court's "obsession" with the Lemon test. Id. at
419. He concluded that the decision shows "nothing less than hostility toward reli-
gion and the children who attend church-sponsored schools." Id. at 420 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist discussed the "Catch 22" paradox the Court created
"whereby aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the supervision it-
self is held to cause an entanglement." Id. at 421 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor questioned the usefulness of entanglement as a separate es-
tablishment clause standard. In New York City, "public school teachers offer[ed]
Title I classes on the premises of parochial schools solely because alternative means
to reach the disadvantaged parochial school students.., were unsuccessful." Id. at
423 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She did not see why "a remedial reading class of-
fered on parochial school premises is any more likely to supplant the secular course
offerings of the parochial school than the same class offered in a portable classroom
next door to the school." Id. at 426. She viewed as extreme the majority reasoning
that state supervision of the program was necessary to ensure that public school
teachers do not inculcate religion. O'Connor stated that the logical conclusion of
the majority's reasoning would "require us to close our public schools, for there is
always some chance that a public schoolteacher will bring religion into a classroom,
regardless of its location." Id. at 429. Like the Chief Justice, she concluded that for
the children in need of Title I services, "the Court's decision is tragic." Id. at 431.
124. Id at 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 419-29. Chief Justice Burger predicted that the intent of Title I, "to
prevent a generation of children from growing up without being able to read"
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While Aguilar determined that delivery of Title I services on
sectarian school grounds was impermissible, it did not address
services to handicapped children under EAHCA. Title I targets
children from low income families. Although there may be some
overlap, handicapped children are not necessarily from low income
families and many low income children are not physically or men-
tally handicapped. Programs for each group are separately legis-
lated and administered.126 Congress' express intention in section
504 and EAHCA was to confer a "civil right" for handicapped chil-
dren to appropriate educational services.127 Title I legislation, how-
ever, does not contain the entitlement language and is perceived as
a benefit rather than an entitlement to low income children.128
Department of Education regulations implementing Aguilar
specifically state that the decision applies narrowly to Title I pro-
grams.129 Although no case has challenged Aquilar's application
to programs involving handicapped children, administrators of
handicapped programs in many states rely on the Department of
Education regulations and continue to offer handicapped services
on sectarian school sites.1 3 0
The close decision (5-4), coupled with the strong dissents filed
by "the conservative coalition" and the changing make-up of the
Court suggest that the Aguilar decision does not restrict special
education services to handicapped children. More importantly, the
right to handicapped services has been specifically designated by
Congress as a civil rights entitlement for handicapped children.
While Title I services and the Michigan Shared Time and Commu-
nity Education programs provide valuable services to poor children
and those enrolled in sectarian programs, they have not been af-
forded the unique designation of an entitlement. The handicapped
child who is owed special education service is, thus, distinctly dif-
ferent from the child of Aguilar or Grand Rapids. The handi-
capped child's situation is much more closely aligned to that of the
Seventh-Day Adventist in Sherbert. The right to handicapped
would be circumvented by the Court's decision. Id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor dissented from the belief that Title I has not resulted in "public
teachers proseletizing at public expense." Id. at 427 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Rehnquist argued that "such sorely needed assistance" should not be denied be-
cause of the establishment clause. Id. at 421 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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services, as an entitlement, poses the constitutional question of re-
quiring a choice between those services and the free exercise of
religion. Grand Rapids and Aguilar did not address this issue.
VI. Conclusion
Special education services are not an educational "frill." The
school system which would attempt to define a Black child's right
to an integrated education as a "frill" would face not only parental
displeasure but an almost certain lawsuit. Congress has also en-
acted legislation that mandates the right of a handicapped child to
a "free, appropriate public education" as part of that child's civil
rights. The very language of section 504 elevates this right of
handicapped children above the social welfare educational pro-
grams which rise and fall with the availability of funding.
Handicapped children do not forfeit these rights because of
their attendance at a sectarian school. The Court has not yet faced
this issue specifically. Its recent decisions have dealt only with the
constitutionality of offering Title I and other enrichment programs
on sectarian sites. Aguilar and Grand Rapids were decided solely
on establishment clause conflicts. They dealt with Title I services
which have not been identified as entitlements. Special education,
however, has been identified as a unique entitlement of handi-
capped children.13 3 When the state forces a choice between the
first amendment right to free exercise of religion and the civil
rights entitlement to an appropriate education it requires an im-
proper, impermissible and illegal choice.
A handicapped child, such as Missy Hogan, is effectively de-
nied her entitlement to an appropriate education if her parents
must choose between the safe and efficient delivery of that entitle-
ment or the free exercise of their religion. The only workable so-
lution is to offer services on the premises of Missy's school. The
benefit of such an arrangement flows directly to the child, not to
her school. Thus, the arrangement would not violate the establish-
ment clause while ensuring the handicapped child and her parents
the free exercise of their religion.
131. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
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